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Abstract—Facilitated by advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs), local energy 7 
trading develops rapidly, playing an important role in the energy supply chain. Thus, it is essential to develop 8 
local trading models and strategies that can benefit participants, not only stimulating local balancing but also 9 
promoting renewable penetration.  10 
This paper proposes a new local energy trading decision-making model for suppliers by using the Cournot 11 
Oligopoly game, considering the uncertainty costs of renewable energy. Four types of representative energy 12 
providers are modelled, traditional thermal generation, wind power, photovoltaic (PV) power and electricity 13 
storage. The revenue of these technologies is extensively formulated according to their operation cost, 14 
investment cost, and income from selling energy. The uncertainty cost of renewable generation is integrated 15 
into the trading, modelled as a penalty for potential energy shortage that is derived from output probability 16 
distribution function (PDF).  This trading model is formulated as a non-cooperative Cournot oligopoly game 17 
to enable energy suppliers to maximize their profits through local trading considering price. The response of 18 
the customer to energy price variations, i.e. demand elasticity, is also included in the model. A unique Nash 19 
equilibrium (NE) and optimum strategies are derived by the proposed Optimal-Generation-Plan (OGP) 20 
Algorithm. As demonstrated in a typical local market, the proposed approach can effectively model and 21 
resolve multiple suppliers' competition in local energy trading. It can work as a vehicle to facilitate the trading 22 
between various generation technologies and customers, realising local balancing and benefiting all market 23 
participants with enhanced revenue and reduced energy bills. 24 
 25 
Keywords —Cournot game, local energy trading, renewable energy, renewable uncertainty, price 26 
elasticity, energy storage, electric vehicles. 27 
1. INTRODUCTION 28 
From EIA statistics, the consumption of electricity worldwide increased three times from 7323BkWh to 29 
21153BkWh in the past 35 years [1]. The continuous increase of demand brings a huge challenge to the 30 
electricity industry in generating, transporting, and distributing energy. Currently, thermal power stations are 31 
still the major producer of global electricity, producing over 60% of electricity [2]. By contrast, distributed 32 
energy resources (DERs), driven by renewable technologies, such as wind power and solar power, are 33 
encouraged by governments in recent years [3], developing at a fast rate. Furthermore, advanced 34 
technologies, such as energy storage, are widely used to support renewable energy in mitigating their 35 
intermittence with up to 2.2GW worldwide capacity in 2018 [4]. By taking advantage of fluctuating 36 
electricity prices, energy storage owners could buy energy at cheaper prices and sell it at higher prices locally 37 
with equipment of battery, electric vehicles (EVs), etc.,[5]. This arbitrage from energy storage also 38 
fundamentally change traditional electricity procurement models.  39 
Incentivized by policies, EVs techniques develop fast in the last decade mainly due to the concern of 40 
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environmental issues [6]. EV can be used as a means of clean transport but also can be regarded as movable 1 
energy storage, which can have many flexibilities [7]. Nowadays, Electric vehicles (EVs) are widely used in 2 
the transportation sector, which has broad application prospects in the smart grid. Particularly, if EVs are 3 
properly managed, they can provide many services to energy markets and network operators. For example, 4 
paper [8] makes use of it to improve the power quality of the grid that minimizes voltage sags with the 5 
discharge power from EV. Paper [9] investigates the strategies of EV charge/discharge management in the 6 
smart grid to benefit EV owners. Paper [10] present the profitable model for EV owners through optimization 7 
of the EV charge and discharge plan. However, as the capacity of a single EV is too small to participate in 8 
markets, the concept of EV aggregator has been proposed to manage a large number of EVs. As an agent, 9 
EV aggregators can manage EV charging and discharging to participate in the energy market and provide 10 
services to networks, thus helping maximize EV owners’ profits [11]. In this paper, EV aggregator is 11 
modelled as flexible energy storage to participate in the local market and use the proposed optimal strategies.   12 
With the high penetration of DERs in distribution systems, local energy trading is proposed to facilitate 13 
local balancing to promote renewable energy penetration and reduce energy costs for customers. In recent 14 
years, many studies have focused on the trading mechanism in local energy markets. In paper [12], a 15 
bidirectional trading mechanism is designed with the utilization of electric vehicles (EVs). By using robust 16 
game theory, authors present a collaborative trading model to maximise the whole system welfare and 17 
develop a non-collaborative trading model to help prosumers improve their profits. In paper [13], the authors 18 
propose a contract scheme, which provides small-scale electricity suppliers and consumers the chance to 19 
participate in direct energy trading for revenue maximisation under asymmetric information energy trading. 20 
Paper [14] presents an approach to form an optimal coalition of heterogeneous DERs in a commercial virtual 21 
power plant (VPP) based on weekly bilateral contracting. With this optimal portfolio of DERs, the VPP 22 
managers could maximize their profits. These studies contribute to involving DER into the local energy 23 
market, but the uncertainties of renewable DER have been neglected in trading. The previous work on local 24 
energy trading mostly models treats renewable energy as controllable, which is not practical. This 25 
shortcoming makes these models difficult to achieve desired results in practical application. 26 
The uncertainty of renewable energy constrains its trading, as there is a high risk of it not being able to 27 
deliver contracts. Recently, many studies have investigated renewable uncertainties. Paper [15] proposes an 28 
optimization algorithm to maximize the utilization of renewable energy sources and plug-in EVs. Renewable 29 
energy uncertainties are companied by a set of valid scenarios. Paper [16] presents an optimal operation 30 
planning for an isolated microgrid. Taking the consideration of renewable uncertainties, the Gaussian 31 
distribution is applied to uncertainty modelling. In paper [17], a multi-scale wind model is developed 32 
considering uncertainty for decision making in the operational planning of microgrid. In summary, the 33 
uncertainty researches in these papers only focus on the physical level. To apply it in energy trading, the 34 
conversion between the physical power flow and cash flow on the economic level is required to build. 35 
In modelling and resolving local energy trading, game theory is widely adopted to formulate trading 36 
schemes and derives optimal strategies for profit maximisation in Nash equilibrium (NE), where no player 37 
has any incentives to change strategies because they cannot benefit more by changing when others retain 38 
their strategies [18]. Paper [19] proposes an event-driven local energy trading for microgrids. The 39 
Stackelberg game is adopted and the desired trading scenario is derived by Stackelberg Nash equilibrium. In 40 
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paper [20], the authors use the Bayesian game model to formulate the schedule of EV  energy consumption 1 
in bidirectional energy trading. Their optimal scenarios are obtained by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium point. 2 
Apart from these models, the Cournot model, with duopoly and oligopoly models, is widely used. Paper [21] 3 
uses the Cournot oligopoly model for a three-player competition in a transmission-constrained system 4 
considering the non-constant marginal cost and derives the equilibrium point. In paper [22], the agents' profit-5 
maximizing behaviours in the wholesale market are formulated and solved. Paper [23] applies the Cournot 6 
model to analyse the nodal prices and transmission constraints in a multimarket. In paper [24], Cournot 7 
oligopoly model is adopted for the imperfect competition among suppliers considering the energy arbitrage.  8 
It can be seen that existing studies on the Cournot game applied to the electricity market focus on the 9 
competition among players, but they ignore the differences in the production and operation of various 10 
technologies, renewable, storage, and traditional suppliers. In energy markets, multiple generators such as 11 
thermal power stations, wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) panels, etc., have very different characteristics, 12 
which will lead to various cost functions and trading strategies. Thus, it is essential to develop local energy 13 
trading models that can authentically reflect both the physical and economic features of various energy 14 
suppliers, particularly for the intermittent generation which has limited controllability and high uncertainties. 15 
In summary, with increasing DERs in distribution networks, local energy trading can help them be consumed 16 
locally, but existing work has obvious weaknesses, which are: 1) the physical differences and revenue 17 
functions between different generators are not well modelled; 2) the uncertainties and uncertainty costs of 18 
renewables are not considered in energy trading.  19 
To resolve the aforementioned drawbacks, this paper develops a novel local energy trading model and 20 
derives the optimal trading strategies for suppliers to ensure their benefits. The Cournot oligopoly game 21 
model is adopted to formulate supplier competition. Four types of typical power suppliers, thermal power 22 
station, wind farm, solar PV, and energy storage, are respectively formulated to build their business models 23 
according to investment, operation, and technologies. In their business models, profits are decided by trading 24 
prices and production quantity, and the costs involve investment, operation, and uncertainty. Particularly, the 25 
uncertainty cost of renewable generation is integrated into the trading, modelled as a penalty for potential 26 
power shortage derived from the output probability distribution function (PDF).  An Optimal-Generation-27 
Plan (OGP) algorithm is proposed to balance the conflict between market price and power generation.  The 28 
Nash equilibrium (NE) in this Cournot oligopoly game is derived by the OGP algorithm and the optimal 29 
strategies at the NE for all suppliers are obtained to ensure their maximum profits.  30 
The main contributions of this paper are: i) it designs a novel local non-cooperative trading model 31 
considering renewable generation and energy storage; ii) it extensively models the uncertainty costs for 32 
renewable generation in local energy trading; iii) the features of various generations are modelled in local 33 
energy trading with a Cournot Oligopoly game for the first time; iv) it solves the model with the proposed 34 
OGP algorithm, which is effective in finding the equilibrium and optimal trading strategies for suppliers.   35 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates local energy trading and discusses the 36 
price elasticity of demand. Section 3 presents the models for four different types of suppliers (thermal, wind, 37 
PV, storage) and their costs and revenues. Section 4 proposes a supplier competition model formulated by 38 
Cournot oligopoly and provides the solution. The case study provided in Section 5 proves the effectiveness 39 
of the proposed approach and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 40 
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2. LOCAL ENERGY TRADING AND DEMAND ELASTICITY 1 
2.1 Local Energy Trading 2 
Promoted by government policies and facilitated by new technologies, DERs are boosted in recent years, 3 
mainly in terms of micro wind turbines and rooftop solar photovoltaic panels. These small-size power sources 4 
at the customer’s side effectively help them save energy bills and empower the controllability of energy 5 
consumption [25]. Thus, the power supply could be realized at the local level, which promotes the 6 
development of local energy trading. Local energy trading means that in a physically close area, an energy 7 
market is designed so that suppliers and prosumers with excessive energy can sell it in the market [26]. For 8 
customers, they can buy the cheaper energy needed from those multiple providers in the local energy market, 9 
rather than only the retailers from the central market. At present, there are diverse participated suppliers in 10 
the local market, including not only conventional power plants but also renewable energy, such as PV and 11 
wind. In addition, EVs and storage technologies induce a new business mechanism in local market trading. 12 
For example, energy storage owners and EV aggregators can make profits by energy arbitrage in the local 13 
market.  Those various suppliers all compete for the market share to serve end customers [27]. As shown in 14 
Fig. 1, customers could purchase their energy from both the main grid and local energy market to find an 15 
optimal strategy to save bills. From the perspective of the energy price, they are generally served with lower 16 
prices by the local energy market [28].  17 
 18 
Fig.  1. Local energy trading 19 
In comparison to centralized energy trading, local energy trading is more flexible with small volume, 20 
occurring in the distribution system [29]. Hence, it is capable to promote DERs which is excluded because 21 
of its small scale and intermittency in the centralized electricity market [30]. With the utilization of smart 22 
grid technologies and information and communication technologies (ICT), the power from DERs can be 23 
traded solely or integrated by agents in the local energy market, which benefits end-customers with low 24 
energy prices and reducing the waste of renewable energy. Furthermore, local energy trading effectively 25 
relieves the heavy burden on the main grid and potentially avoids the expensive grid expansion [31]. On the 26 
other hand, there are potential risks induced by renewable uncertainties. Thus, a reasonable trading 27 
mechanism is required to provide an appropriate trading platform for energy suppliers and consumers to 28 



















2.2 Price Elasticity of Demand 1 
From the market perspective, the real demand fluctuates above and below the scheduled demand because 2 
it is affected by energy prices. In the local trading, the low electricity price will motivate consumers to 3 
increase demand and on the contrary, they will reduce their unnecessary usage to save bills when the price 4 
is high. It reflects the price elasticity of demand.  5 
The price elasticity of demand is defined as the slope of the demand curve [32], representing the 6 




                                                                                  (1) 8 
where D is the demand in the local energy market; ∆𝐷 is the change in the quantity of demand; ∆𝛿 is the 9 









Fig.  2. Price elasticity of Demand 12 
 13 
In the energy market, there is an interplay between demand, supply, and energy price. Thus, the demand-14 
supply relationship will affect the energy price in the local market and trading. From the perspective of 15 
demand, it consists of two parts: rigid demand and elasticity demand. The rigid demand depends on the 16 
necessary consumption, normally being a certain value for the period. While the elasticity demand represents 17 
the consumption without the requirement of the specific duration, affected by the energy price. The 18 
complicated relationship can be concluded as a constraint, which is linearized for simplicity, that: 19 
𝐷0 + (𝛿 − 𝛿0) − ∑ 𝑃 = 0                                                                     (2) 20 
where the ∑ 𝑃 is the sum of the power output of each participated supplier, representing the total generation 21 
of the local energy market during hourly trading. 22 
3. SUPPLIER BUSINESS MODEL 23 
In this section, four types of electricity suppliers, thermal power station, wind power generation, PV power 24 
generation, and electricity storage at the local level, are analysed to build their mathematical formulations 25 
for hourly trading. Their operational costs are quantified according to generation quantities and technologies. 26 
Their cost functions and revenue functions are also derived respectively. 27 
From the perspective of suppliers, their costs are decided by three key time factors: initial investment, 28 
operation, and trading. In the initial building period, there is a setup capital. The initial investment covers the 29 
cost of building the plant, devices installation, obtaining related permission, etc. Then, during operation, 30 
there is operational cost, including the generation cost, the cost for operating and maintenance. In the trading 31 
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period, due to the intermittency of renewable energy, there is an extra uncertainty cost for renewable 1 
suppliers to secure energy transactions. 2 
3.1 Investment Recovering Cost 3 
The investment cost varies, depending on generation technologies. For thermal power stations, the initial 4 
investment covers the location fee, cost of devices (boiler, pre-heater, cooling system, etc.), cost of safety 5 
equipment, cost of various government permissions and the cost of building up the power plant. Although a 6 
series of such expenditures require a large number of initial costs, the investment recovering cost distributed 7 
to unit power is not very high with corresponding large-scale generation.  8 
The initial investment plays generally a major role in the total cost and recovering the investment cost 9 
would take years. The investment recovering cost (IRC) related to the power output can be formulated as: 10 
𝐼𝑅𝐶(𝑃) =
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∗ (1 + 𝑑)
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 × 𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑃                                                              (3) 11 
where Cinitial is the initial investment of supplier; Nplan is the number of years to recoup the initial capital in 12 
the plan; d is the discount rate; Eannual is the total annual power output of the suppliers; P is the hourly power 13 
output. 14 
3.2 Operational Cost 15 
During the operation period, there is related operational cost. 16 
1) Thermal power station 17 
The thermal power station converts the heat energy to electric power, whose operation cost is determined 18 
by fuel cost, incremental cost, input/output, and heat rate. Its generation cost is formed as a quadratic equation 19 
[33]: 20 
𝑂𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡  ) = 𝑎𝑃𝑡
2 + 𝑏𝑃𝑡 + 𝑐                                                              (4) 21 
where Pt is the power output of power station; a, b and c are the fuel cost coefficients. 22 
2) Wind power generation 23 
In comparison to the traditional thermal power plant, wind power is free, clean, and reproducible, saving 24 
the expenditure on material procurement. Meanwhile, wind power is intermittent and thus there are balancing 25 
costs induced due to the errors in hourly forecasting. According to paper [34], the operational cost of the 26 
wind farm is formulated by: 27 
𝑂𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤) = ∫ 𝑊𝑃𝑈𝐼𝐶(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
𝑃
0
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡                                                 (5) 28 
= 𝛼𝑤𝑃𝑤
2 + 𝛽𝑤𝑃𝑤 + γ𝑤                                                                  29 
where WPUIC is the wind power uncertainty incremental cost which qualifies the extra balancing cost for 30 
increasing unit wind power generation; Const is the cost for balancing wind power deviation; Pw is the power 31 
output of wind farm; αw, βw, and γw are adjustable coefficients. 32 
3) PV power generation 33 
Similar to wind power, the PV system is cost-benefit and clean without carbon emission. There are 34 







𝑃𝑃𝑉                                                    (6) 1 
where PPV is the PV power output; OPV is the annual operation cost; MPV is the annual maintenance fee.  2 
4) Electricity storage  3 
The energy storage makes money through energy arbitrage by making use of the fluctuations in electricity 4 
prices. For battery owners, storage will charge the battery during the off-peak periods with low prices and 5 
sell them back to the market at a high price in peak time. According to Schumacher’s battery model, there 6 
exist energy losses during the charging and discharging process [36], which will induce extra energy 7 
consumption. From the perspective of generation cost, it contains the cost of charging the battery, 8 
proportional operation cost, and fixed maintenance fee. The mathematical formulation for the operation cost 9 







𝜂𝑜 + 𝑀𝑠                                                  (7) 11 
where Ps is the power output of storage supplier; δin is the unit purchase price for electric power; ηo is the 12 
weighting coefficient of the operation cost, ηd is the battery deterioration rate of energy; Ms is the 13 
maintenance fee. 14 
5) EV aggregator 15 
For EV aggregators, they can also participate in the local trading to procure energy when charging and 16 
sell energy when discharging on behalf of EVs. By using appropriate incentives to manage EVs charging 17 
and discharging behaviours, there is considerable profit for EV aggregators. It is assumed that the EV 18 
aggregator manages m EVs in its area. Thus, the capacity of EV aggregator can be derived as the sum of 19 
available storage space for each EV: 20 
𝑃𝑐 = 𝑟 ∙ ∑ 𝑐𝑎𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
                                                           (8) 21 
where r is the charger efficiency; cai is the capacity of EV i; Di is the demand of EV i.  22 
Based on energy arbitrage, the operation cost of EV aggregator mainly depends on electricity cost and 23 




+ 𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝑘                                                           (9) 25 
where k is the number of manageable EVs for discharging; δc is the electricity price during the charging; DE 26 
is the battery degradation cost for an EV. 27 
3.3 Uncertainty Cost  28 
1) Renewables 29 
Renewable generation commonly relies on natural sources, such as wind power, solar power, kinetic 30 
energy from the river [38]. They are clean but also un-dispatchable. Due to this feature, the uncertainties of 31 
renewable bring the challenge to local energy trading. To handle this problem, there is the extra cost related 32 
to renewable uncertainties to guarantee that renewable suppliers can provide agreed energy. If the real output 33 
generation cannot satisfy the amount required in the transaction, suppliers need to pay the penalty for the 34 
shortage. In this case, the shortfall will be purchased from the ancillary market at a high price. Therefore, 35 
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there is a penalty applied to the potential shortage part, whose expectation can be expressed by the product 1 
integral of the shortage and its corresponding probability. The renewable uncertainty cost (UC) can be 2 
formulated as: 3 




                                                  (10) 4 
where 𝑃+ is the real power output; 𝑃 is the planned power output in energy transaction;  𝑓(𝑃) is the PDF of 5 
renewable power output; 𝛿𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 is the unit electricity price in the ancillary market. 6 
The PDF of renewable power output is derived by Kernel density estimation (KDE) according to historical 7 










                                                         (11) 9 
where n is the size of samples; h is the bandwidth between samples; K is a non-negative function referred to 10 
as the kernel satisfying ∫ 𝐾(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 1.  11 















]                                             (12) 13 
where 𝑥0 is the peak location parameter; γ is the half-width at the half-maximum, indicating the scale. 14 














)                                   (13) 16 
where μ is the expectation of the distribution at the same place as median; σ is the standard deviation;  𝜎2 is 17 
the variance of the distribution.  18 
2) EV aggregator 19 
EV aggregators can also face uncertainty as the manageable energy power discharging is affected by EV 20 
owner behaviours, which is beyond control. Therefore, the uncertainty is dominated by the available 21 
discharging EVs number k. The real energy output can be represented as: 22 
𝑃𝐸𝑉
+ = 𝑠𝑜𝑐 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ 𝑘+                                                                     (14) 23 
where soc is the state of charge manageable EVs that can be used for discharging; k+ is the number of real 24 
arrived EVs. 25 
By submitting (14) into (10), EV aggregator uncertainty cost can be calculated as: 26 
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) = 𝛿𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 ∫ 𝑓(𝑘




                           (15) 27 
3.4 Revenue Function 28 
According to generation technologies, their cost functions are proposed and revenue functions as follows. 29 
1) Thermal power station 30 
The thermal power station is fuelled by natural gas or coal, making it highly controllable. Because of this 31 
feature, there is no uncertainty cost for the thermal power station. Its cost mainly includes investment cost 32 
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and operational cost, which is derived as follows in (16). The first part is operation cost derived in (4) and 1 
the second part is investment cost calculated in (3).  2 
𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡  ) = 𝑂𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡  ) + 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡)                                                           (16) 3 
The revenue for the thermal power station is the income from selling energy (unit price times output) 4 
minus the total cost, which is as follows: 5 
𝑅𝑡(𝑃𝑡) = 𝛿𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡  ) = 𝛿𝑃𝑡 − 𝑂𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡  ) − 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑡(𝑃𝑡)                                      (17) 6 
where δ is the unit energy price in the local market.  7 
By substituting (3) and (4) into (17), the final revenue function for the thermal power station can be 8 
obtained as follows: 9 
𝑅𝑡(𝑃𝑡) = 𝛿𝑃𝑡 − (𝑎𝑃𝑡
2 + 𝑏𝑃𝑡 + 𝑐 +
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∗ (1 + 𝑑)
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 × 𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑃𝑡)                         (18) 10 
2) Wind power generation 11 
Generally, large size wind powers plants perform better in controllability and the small size is more easily 12 
affected by the weather. Thus, from the perspective of cost, apart from the initial investment cost in (3) and 13 
operational cost in (5), the uncertainty cost in (10) in local trading is essential to be considered. The cost 14 
function of the wind farm is formulated by the sum as follows: 15 
𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤) = 𝑂𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤) + 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤) + 𝑈𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤)                                          (19) 16 
The revenue function can be derived through the income minus its total cost, which is as follows:  17 
𝑅𝑤(𝑃𝑤) = 𝛿𝑃𝑤 − 𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤  ) = 𝛿𝑃𝑡 − 𝑂𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤) − 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤) − 𝑈𝐶𝑤(𝑃𝑤)             (20) 18 
Replaced by (3), (5) and (10) into (20), its final revenue function can be represented as follows: 19 
𝑅𝑤(𝑃𝑤) = 𝛿𝑃𝑤 − (𝛼𝑤𝑃𝑤
2 + 𝛽𝑤𝑃𝑤 + 𝛾𝑤 +
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∗ (1 + 𝑑)
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 × 𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑃𝑤                                                         20 






)                                                                                   (21) 21 
where 𝑃𝑤
+is the wind power output in the practical generation;  𝑓(𝑃𝑤
+) is the PDF of wind power output which 22 
is formulated by Cauchy distribution.  23 
3) PV power station 24 
PV power generation also faces the challenge of uncertainties, whose cost function is expressed by the 25 
sum of the uncertainty cost in (10), the initial investment cost in (3) and operational cost in (6) as: 26 
𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) = 𝑈𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) + 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) + 𝑂𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉)                                    (22) 27 
Thus, the profit of the PV generator can be proposed by subtracting its cost from the sale income: 28 
𝑅𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) = 𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑉 − 𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) = 𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑉 − 𝑈𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) − 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) − 𝑂𝐶𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉)     (23) 29 
By substituting (3), (6) and (10) into (23), the final revenue function can be derived as follows: 30 
𝑅𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑃𝑉) = 𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑉 − (
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∗ (1 + 𝑑)
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 × 𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑃𝑃𝑉 + 𝛿𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 ∫ 𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑉











+  is the PV power output in the practical generation;  𝑓( 𝑃𝑃𝑉
+ ) is the PDF of PV power generation 31 
output which is formulated by the normal distribution.  32 
4) Electricity storage 33 
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Different from renewable generation, energy storage is limited by the capacity of batteries. In terms of 1 
the total costs, it only has the operation cost in (7) and investment cost in (3). The mathematical formulation 2 
of the cost function is: 3 
𝐶𝑠(𝑃𝑠) = 𝑂𝐶𝑠(𝑃𝑠) + 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑠(𝑃𝑠)                                                              (25) 4 
Then, according to its total income and total cost, the revenue function is deduced by this difference as: 5 
𝑅𝑠(𝑃𝑠) = 𝛿𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠(𝑃𝑠) = 𝛿𝑃𝑠 − 𝑂𝐶𝑠(𝑃𝑠) − 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑠(𝑃𝑠)                                   (26)   6 
By substituting (3) and (7) into (26), the final revenue function can be obtained as follows: 7 
𝑅𝑠(𝑃𝑠) = 𝛿𝑃𝑠 − [𝛿𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑠
(1 − 𝜂𝑑)
(1 + 𝜂𝑜) + 𝑀𝑠 +
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∗ (1 + 𝑑)
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛
𝑁𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 × 𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑃𝑠]                  (27) 8 
5) EV aggregator 9 
For EV aggregators the total cost contains investment cost in (3), operation cost in (9) and uncertainty 10 
cost in (15), represented as: 11 
𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) = 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉)   + 𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) + 𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉)                                    (28) 12 
Hence, the revenue function is obtained by subtracting the total cost from its total income as follows: 13 
𝑅𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) = 𝛿𝑃𝐸𝑉 − 𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) = 𝛿𝑃𝐸𝑉 − 𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉)  − 𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) − 𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉)       (29)   14 
By substituting (3), (9) and (15) into (29), the final revenue function can be obtained as follows: 15 
𝑅𝐸𝑉(𝑃𝐸𝑉) = 𝛿𝑃𝐸𝑉 − [






+ 𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝑘                16 
   +𝛿𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 ∫ 𝑓(𝑘




]                                                     (30) 17 
4. SUPPLIER COMPETITION IN THE LOCAL ENERGY MARKET BY COURNOT OLIGOPOLY 18 
4.1 Supplier Competition Model 19 
In the local energy market, multiple suppliers compete for market sharing. This supplier competition is 20 
formulated by the Cournot oligopoly model. The participated suppliers are defined as ꞷ={1, 2,…, n}, which 21 
independently determines their own production to achieve profit maximization. According to the revenue 22 
functions in (13), (15), (17) and (19), it can generally be concluded with the form as:  23 
𝑅𝑖(𝑃𝑖) = 𝛿𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶(𝑃𝑖);  ∀𝑖 ∈ ω                                                         (31)                              24 
where 𝑃𝑖  is the power output of the supplier i; C(Pi) is the cost function of supplier i; ω is the set of suppliers. 25 
In this revenue function, the energy market price δ is affected by the total generation with the constraint 26 
in (2). From the demand-supply curve, the price will decrease with the growing supply. Therefore, the 27 
suppliers need to find an equilibrium for their generation to maximize their revenues. 28 





∗);  ∀𝑖 ∈ ω                             (32) 29 
s.t. 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑖 ≤ 𝑃𝑖
𝑐  30 
where 𝑃𝑖
∗  is the optimal production of supplier i corresponding to its maximum profit; 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛  is the low 31 
boundary of the generation for supplier i; 𝑃𝑖
𝑐 is the generation capacity of supplier i. 32 
4.2 The Optimal-Generation-Plan Algorithm 33 
The proposed OGP algorithm is to find the Nash equilibrium point in the Cournot game model, where the 34 
optimal generation plan is derived. Every supplier can obtain the maximum revenue as long as they follow 35 
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this generation strategy.  1 
According to the supplier business model, their revenue functions all can be written in the following form 2 
generally. 3 
𝑅𝑖(𝑃𝑖) = 𝛿𝑃𝑖 − (𝐺𝑖𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝐻𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖);  ∀𝑖 ∈ ω                                                (33) 4 
where 𝐺𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 , 𝐾𝑖 are the constant depending on the cost coefficients of supplier i. 5 
The unit energy price can be substituted as a function of all participants’ production quantities in (2). 6 








+ 𝛿0 − 𝐻𝑖) 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖                               (34) 8 
The maximum profit exists in this quadratic function when the partial derivate equals to zero [42], given 9 
when the following constraint satisfied: 10 
2 (
1






+ 𝐻𝑖 − 𝛿0                                                  (35) 11 
For the market with n participated suppliers, the whole system can be modelled as: 12 
[
2( −1 − 𝐺1)
−1





⋮                    ⋮ ⋱ ⋮








−1 + 𝐻1 − 𝛿0
𝐷0
−1 + 𝐻2 − 𝛿0
⋮
𝐷0
−1 + 𝐻𝑛 − 𝛿0
]              (36) 13 
The optimal model can be solved in the Jacobian matrix by the Newton method [43]. In addition, the 14 
suppliers’ generation capacity is set as the constraint in the optimization model. 15 
 4.3 Optimal Generation Strategy 16 
In this multi-supplier trading, the proposed method is implemented in three stages in Fig. 3: identifying 17 
the participated suppliers, creating mathematical formulations, and determining generation strategies by 18 
OGP algorithm: 19 
• The information about all market suppliers and demand is identified.  20 
• It is to build suppliers’ profit formulations. In the supplier model, their generation costs are 21 
formulated by two categories:  22 
i) For the normal suppliers whose generation is controllable, their costs include two parts: investment 23 
cost and operational cost.  24 
ii) For the renewable generation, the uncertainty cost should be considered in energy trading. Besides 25 
the investment cost and operational cost, the uncertainty cost is included to cover the potential 26 
shortage of their supply, developed according to the PDF of the practical generation.  27 
• Based on the analysis of cost, the suppliers’ revenue functions are formulated. 28 
• Finally, the optimal strategy for each supplier is derived to help them maximize revenue by using 29 
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Fig.  3. Flowchart of the proposed method 2 
5. CASE STUDY 3 
In this section, a case study is provided to illustrate the proposed mechanism and designed models on 4 
hourly local energy trading. With the implementation of the OGP algorithm, the optimal generation strategies 5 
for suppliers can be derived at the NE point in the Cournot game model that helps them gain maximum 6 
profits.  7 
There are four typical electricity suppliers investigated in this case study, which are thermal generation, 8 
wind power, PV power, and storage respectively. According to their generation technologies, investment 9 
cost, capacity constraints, and related operational cost coefficients are summarized in Table I. 10 
 11 
TABLE I  12 









Operational Cost Coefficients 
Thermal 4 20 5.8 a =0.0087 b =13.3 c =81 
Wind 5 20 7 𝛼𝑤=0.002 𝛽𝑤 =10.4 𝛾w =50 
PV 0 3 15.7 OPV = £15000 MPV =£10000 Eannual =5000MWh 
Storage 0 6 6.3 δin = £16/MWh ηo = 5% ηd = 10% 
 14 
In order to ensure the fairness of the trading, the uncertainty cost is charged for wind and PV power. For 15 
the wind farm, the PDF of wind power output is followed by the Cauchy distribution [28], set as 𝑥0=15 and 16 
γ =2. For the PV generation, the output is modelled by the normalized distribution [29], set as 𝜇 =2 and 𝜎 17 
13 
 
=0.5. There is a penalty cost charged to cover the possible shortage in proportion to their PDFs of generation. 1 
The power shortage will be purchased from the ancillary market with a supposed price 𝛿𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦= £35/MWh. 2 
5.1 Optimal Strategies 3 
In this case, the small local energy market is composed of these four suppliers with the price elasticity 4 
= −2 and the reference point for the market is set as 𝐷0 = 28MWh and 𝛿0 = £32/MWh. In an-hour 5 
period, by using the OGP algorithm, the optimal output power (P*) of suppliers with maximum revenues are 6 
derived, given in TABLE II. The iteration process is shown in Fig. 4. 7 
 8 
Fig.  4. Iteration of the OGP algorithm 9 
TABLE II  10 
OPTIMAL GENERATION STRATEGY WITH CORRESPONDING MAXIMUM REVENUES 11 
Supplier Thermal Wind PV Storage 
P*(MWh) 17 11.5 1.6 5.8 
Max revenue (£) 67 58 9 15 
 12 
Table II shows the NE point in this market. Following this generation strategy, each supplier could 13 
maximize its revenue. Their revenues and the validation of their optimal strategies are demonstrated in Fig.5. 14 
 15 


























Thermal Wind PV Storage
14 
 
For the thermal power station, the curve “Thermal” demonstrates the results of: {𝑃𝑡 , 𝑃w
∗ , 𝑃PV
∗ , 𝑃s
∗}, which 1 
reflects the change of its profit on the condition that the other suppliers follow the optimal generation 2 
strategies. Initially, there is a loss when production is under 5.6MWh because the earning is too low to cover 3 
its generation cost. Then it becomes profitable with the growing output. This revenue curve is a convex curve 4 
and the peak is arrived at 17MWh with the maximum profit of £67, matching the result of the OGP algorithm. 5 
For the wind farm, with the growing production, its revenue increases to the maximum point £58 at 6 
11.5MWh, and then gradually falls due to the expensive uncertainty cost. When more wind power is required 7 
to supply, there is a growing potential risk accompanied. It clearly shows in the diagram that when the 8 
planned output power is over 16.8MWh, there is a deficit due to expensive uncertainty cost above £84. For 9 
PV, its maximum revenue is £9 achieved by 1.6MWh, corresponding to the calculated optimal strategy. It is 10 
profitable when its generation is below 2.4MWh. As renewable energy, it also faces expensive uncertainty 11 
cost when the high quantity is required. Thus, it would face an economic loss after 2.4MWh. For storage, the 12 
profitability of energy arbitrage is based on the price difference. Clearly shown in Fig. 5, its maximum 13 
profitable point is 5.8MWh in generation with an earning of £15. It is clear that the generation quantities at 14 
their maximum profit points for these four suppliers all corresponding to the NE point derived by the OGP 15 
algorithm. It verifies the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 16 
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis 17 
5.2.1 Uncertainty of renewables 18 
The uncertainty of renewable energy determines its performance in local trading, thus affecting the profits. 19 
For the wind farm, the uncertainty is reflected by the PDF of its power output. Specifically, it depends on 20 
two parameters in the Cauchy distribution of PDF: location parameter 𝑥0 and scale parameter γ. 21 
 22 
Fig.  6. Optimal power output for suppliers in different peak location 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of wind 23 
PDF when γ =2 24 
From the perspective of output PDF, 𝑥0  is the peak location indicating the situation with the highest 25 
probability, whose impact is displayed in Fig. 6. When the peak of PDF moves from 15MWh to 20MWh, 26 
the wind plant has a larger generation output according to its optimal strategy, from 11.7MWh to 14.5MWh. 27 
On the contrary, the other three suppliers would slightly reduce their generation, 0.9MWh for thermal, 28 
0.1MWh for PV, and 0.9MWh for storage to optimize their profits. The increase in 𝑥0 enhances the supply 29 




































wind farm, there is a small decrease in the optimal output for other suppliers. In conclusion, the larger 𝑥0 the 1 
better it is for the wind farm. 2 
As far as the scale parameter is concerned, γ is the half-width at the half-maximum of PDF. In other words, 3 
the larger the value of γ, the curve of PDF is more flattening. Fig. 7. reflects the impact of γ when 𝑥0=15MWh. 4 
It can be seen that wind has the biggest change because it is directly affected by γ. Its optimal output power 5 
shows a 1.7MWh-decrease from 12.8MWh to 11.1MWh, when its PDF scale grows from 1 to 3. Meanwhile, 6 
the optimal output for the other three suppliers all shows a slight increase, 0.5MWh for thermal, 0.1MWh 7 
for PV, and 0.6MWh for storage respectively. The bigger γ means the more even PDF of wind plant output, 8 
which would bring more uncertainty cost for wind power. Thus, the optimal generation strategy is to reduce 9 
output in compensation for the increased risk of uncertainty cost. To conclude, the wind farm has a better 10 
performance with a smaller γ. 11 
 12 
Fig.  7. Optimal power output for suppliers in different scale 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5 and 3 of wind PDF when 13 
𝑥0=15MWh 14 
5.2.2 Uncertainty cost 15 
Although the uncertainty cost is a burden to renewable energy, it is significant to secure the fairness of 16 
energy trading and avoid the potential risk of power imbalance.  For the wind farm, its generation cost is 17 
illustrated in Fig. 8. Clearly, the generation cost with uncertainty cost exponentially increases with growing 18 
output. When more power is planned to trade, the higher the risk of the shortage between practical generation 19 
and plan, and the higher uncertainty cost is induced at the same time.  20 
 21 
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TABLE III  1 
OPTIMAL POWER OUTPUT FOR SUPPLIERS 2 
Supplier Thermal  Wind  PV Storage  
P* 
(MWh) 
Without uncertainty cost 14.5 18.2 3 3.2 
With uncertainty cost 17 11.7 1.6 5.8 
 3 
Table III compares the four suppliers’ optimal generation strategies with and without the consideration of 4 
renewable uncertainty cost. It is clear that, with such uncertainty cost, the optimal generation for the wind 5 
plant reduces by about a third, from 18.2MWh to 11.7MWh. Compared to wind power, the power output for 6 
PV falls from 3MWh to 1.6MWh, nearly being cut in a half. In this case, the PV output C~(2, 0.5) has more 7 
fluctuations than the wind power N~(15,2), thus highly affected by the charge of uncertainty cost, in 8 
accordance with the results. By considering the uncertainty cost, renewable suppliers would reduce their 9 
planned supply to mitigate the risk of suffering an expensive shortage penalty. On the other hand, the thermal 10 
power station and controllable storage supplier are more competitive so that their optimal generation 11 
strategies have an increase of 2.6MWh and 2.7MWh. 12 
5.3 Optimal Strategies with EV Aggregator Included 13 
In this case, an EV aggregator is also introduced into the local energy market trading. It is assumed that 14 
EV aggregator operates 100 EVs under 95% charging efficiency and the capacity is 50kwh for each EV. The 15 
charging price and battery degradation cost for each car are set at £16/MWh and £0.1. In practice, it is 16 
possible that not all EVs signed up for trading can be immediately available to charge as scheduled the 17 
aggregator, and thus the PDF of the number of available  EVs is assumed as the normalized distribution 18 
(50,30). Based on the proposed OGP algorithm, the optimal strategies of these five suppliers in the an-hour 19 
period are derived at the NE point. With this strategy, each supplier could maximize its revenue. Their 20 






∗ } = {14, 12.5, 1.6, 2.7, 3.2}MWh 22 
 23 
Fig.  9 Revenue for five suppliers when the other four suppliers all follow the optimal generation 24 
Their maximum revenue points are marked in black points. For the thermal power station, initially, the 25 
profit is too low to cover its generation cost, leading to a loss before 8MWh output. Then, it achieves profits 26 
with the growing output and realizes the maximum revenue of £20 at 14MW, matching the NE point. For 27 
17 
 
wind, PV, and EV aggregators, their revenue curves show a similar convex trend. In growing production, 1 
their revenues gradually increase to the maximum points, respectively £76.4 at 12.5MWh, £7 at 1.6MWh, 2 
and £5.1 at 3.2MWh, and then fall to the deficits which are caused by expensive uncertainty costs. During 3 
high production periods, more power required means more potential risk. It clearly shows that for these three 4 
suppliers, the uncertainty costs are unaffordable when the outputs are over 18MWh, 2.2MWh, and 4MWh 5 
separately. For storage, it arrives at the maximum profitable point of £3.9 with an output of 2.7MWh. All 6 
suppliers realize their maximum revenues at the NE point, which proves the effectiveness of the proposed 7 
approach. 8 
By summarising the above case studies, this proposed method has the following benefits to key 9 
stakeholders: 10 
• For energy customers, the proposed model efficiently guides suppliers to play in the market, and 11 
thus customers can buy cheaper energy locally compared to that from the main energy market. In this way, 12 
customers can also avoid paying high network costs as their use of the main grid is reduced. They can also 13 
have a more secure supply once there outages in the main grid by procuring energy locally. 14 
• For society, the proposed local energy trading for suppliers in the local energy market can promote 15 
the local generation and supplier business in energy transactions, which will help local businesses. In addition, 16 
the flourishing local energy market not only enhances supply security and releases the constraints on the 17 
main grid, but also provides local suppliers and customers more options to maximize their profits.  18 
• For the environment, the proposed method can promote local balancing, so that renewable energy 19 
can be consumed locally as much as possible. This will help reduce emissions, as normally renewable energy 20 
has to be curtailed due to its intermittency or constrained network. 21 
Due to transportation constraints, it is possible that not all EVs signed up for trading can be immediately 22 
available to charge as scheduled the aggregator. The energy shortage can cause trading risk for the aggregator 23 
who has to purchase that from the ancillary market to ensure the transaction, which is modelled as the 24 
uncertainty cost for the aggregator. It is thus assumed that the number of available EVs for discharging is 25 
stochastic in the trading. During high load periods, more energy is required and thus the higher risk of 26 
shortage is induced, which could lead to the expensive uncertainty costs for EV aggregators. During low load 27 
periods, the risks tend to be low due to both low energy prices and total trading amount. The impact of 28 
uncertainty is also studied in the case study. EV aggregator’s revenue curve shows a convex trend. With 29 
growing demand, the revenue gradually increases to the maximum of £5.1 at 3.2MWh, and then falls to the 30 
deficits in high demand periods caused by the expensive uncertainty costs.  31 
6. CONCLUSIONS  32 
This paper proposes a Cournot oligopoly model in the local energy market to formulate the competition 33 
among non-cooperative suppliers with consideration of renewable uncertainty. Different from most current 34 
research without differentiating the features of multiple suppliers (traditional, renewable, storage, etc.), this 35 
paper designs individual business models that effectively derive the optimal generation strategy to benefit 36 
suppliers in local energy trading. Through extensive demonstration, the following key observations are 37 
obtained: 38 
• Four typical electricity providers – thermal power station, wind power generation, PV power 39 
18 
 
generation, and electricity storage are analysed respectively. In addition, EV aggregators are considered as 1 
well. Their individual business models are formulated in mathematical models created in mathematics to 2 
formulate their trading behaviours and the competitive strategies are concluded for guidance.   3 
• This paper studies renewables uncertainty and models it in energy trading, which promotes DERs 4 
in the local market. The uncertainties are formulated in production and the concept of uncertainty cost is 5 
presented to weigh their generation capacity and provide security for energy trading. In addition, it is shown 6 
in the case study that, with this charge applied, these renewables generations would prefer conservative 7 
strategies, which properly reduce their production to guarantee an adequate supply. Meanwhile, it improves 8 
the stability of the local energy market and enhances the security of the power system. 9 
• In the supplier competition model, the price elasticity of demand is applied for price constraint to 10 
deal with the complex interactions between demand, supply, and price signals, which reflects the rigid 11 
demand and elastic demand in daily electricity consumption. This point is combined in Cournot Oligopoly 12 
to make the model more practical.  13 
• The OGP Algorithm is to find the NE point that effectively derives the equilibrium solutions. The 14 
participated suppliers could be benefited by using these optimal generation strategies to gain the maximum 15 
profits in local energy trading. With this work facilitated in the local energy market, it enhances the local 16 
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